



Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE and INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION SECURITY

Preventing the Kill Chain in
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) / SCADA

Mati Epstein

Global sales manager

Critical Infrastructure and ICS

A large, white, stylized arrow pointing to the right, with the text 'ONE STEP AHEAD' written inside it in a bold, sans-serif font. The arrow is set against a dark, textured background that looks like a close-up of a plant or tree branch.

ONE STEP AHEAD

Industrial Control Systems (ICS)/SCADA are All Around Us



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Water & Sewage



Electricity



Transportation



Critical manufacturing



Industrial Automation



Oil & Gas



Building Management

... and we **rely on it every day** for our basic functions and needs.

Facts and Reality



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Dec 2014

German Steel Mill was hacked by Spear Phishing – Massive damage to the factory

Dec 2015

Blackout across western Ukraine due to BlackEnergy Spear Phishing malware attack (And again on January 19th)

March 2016

Hackers breached a water utility's control system and changed the levels of chemicals being used to treat tap water (Kemuri Water Company)

Most recent news



Check Point[®]
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

June, 2017

NotPetya Ransomware hits Ukraine's power distribution company, Mearsk and other's OT infrastructure

July 16th, 2017

Energy sector hacking campaign targeted more than 15 U.S. firms

(Cyberscoop)

December, 2017

Triton Malware - Affecting S.E. Triconex Safety Controllers, which are used widely in critical infrastructure . Threat actors deployed malware capable of manipulating emergency shutdown systems

(Schneider Electric)

US ICS-CERT report: (Jan-18)


FY 2017 Most Prevalent Weaknesses



3rd year in a row

Area of Weakness	Rank	Risk
Boundary Protection	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undetected unauthorized activity in critical systems Weaker boundaries between ICS and enterprise networks
Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of accountability and traceability for user actions if an account is compromised Increased difficulty in securing accounts as personnel leave organization, especially sensitive for users with administrator access
Allocation of Resources	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No backup or alternate personnel to fill position if personnel leave organization Loss of critical knowledge of control systems
Physical Access Control	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unauthorized physical access to field equipment and control systems provides opportunity to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maliciously modify, delete, or copy device programs Access the ICS network Steal or vandalize cyber assets Add rogue devices to capture and retransmit network traffic
Account Management	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compromised unsecured password communications Password compromise could allow trusted unauthorized access to systems
Least Functionality	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased vectors for malicious party access to critical systems Rogue internal access established

Most Attacked Sectors
2016



WHO ARE THE ATTACKERS?

State Actors

BlackEnergy, CrashOverride

EXAMPLES OF
INDUSTRY ATTACKS
OVER THE
PAST YEARS

Insiders

Maroochy County Sewage


Teenagers

Lodz Tram

Activists

Operation Green Rights


Why Are These Attacks Possible?



Legacy System



Default Configuration



Less/No Updates



Less/No Encryption



Policies & Procedures



Less/No Segmentation



Latency Concerns

Attack Vectors Reaching the OT Network



**Removable
Media**



**Email Phishing
and Attachments**



**Remote
Technicians**



**Software
Vulnerabilities**



**Guest Networks
Unprotected Sockets**

Securing against Attack Vectors

Attack Vector	Check Point solution
Removable Media	Endpoint data protection
Spear Phishing	Sandblast Emulation and Extraction
Ransomware	SandBlast Anti-Ransomware
Remote Technicians	Secured VPN Connectivity and Two Factor Authentication
Software Vulnerabilities	IDS/IPS
Virus's and BOT's	AV and AB Blades
Missing Boundary	Firewall and segmentation



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HOW CAN WE **SECURELY** AND **RELIABLY** STAY AHEAD?



Best Practices for Securing OT

Secure **Both**
OT and IT
Environments

Protect IT with Advanced Threat
Prevention Technologies

Clear Segmentation between
OT and IT/Internet

Deploy Specialized ICS/SCADA
Security Technologies



CHECK POINT'S

Security Solutions

for Industrial Control Systems/SCADA

CYBER DEFENSE

Visibility of
ICS/SCADA Traffic

Enforcement of
ICS/SCADA Traffic

SCADA-Aware
Threat Prevention

Ruggedized
Appliances for
Harsh
Environments


SCADA

Visibility

Real Time SCADA/ICS Network monitoring



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Enhanced OT Visibility



Communication Information


- Protocols & Commands
- Asset connections within the ecosystem
- Open/proprietary protocols

Asset Information



- IP and MAC Address
- Equipment vendor
- Equipment type (PLC, HMI, Engineering Workstation, Switch, etc.)
- Asset model name and Serial #
- Firmware version
- Physical data (rack slots)

Network Mapping

- What assets you have on the network?
- How assets are communicating and who is accessing them?
- Uncover configuration issues and vulnerable assets



Visibility by SCADA Protocols and Commands




And many more.....

Over **1000 SCADA and IoT** commands
in Check Point Application Control

Updated list: appwiki.checkpoint.com

Asset information


Detailed asset information – Type, Vendor, Firmware and more




NORMAL RISK LEVEL

Chemical_plant / **Rockwell Automation**

PLC







DEVICE INFORMATION


IP	10.1.30.1	Vendor	Rockwell Automation
MAC	00:1D:9C:C0:04:9D	Model	1756-ENBT/A
Network	Default	Firmware version	V6.006
VLAN	0	Serial	00987DBF
Protocols	ARP / CIP / ENIP / ICMP / TCP		
Site	Default		

MORE DETAILS

Type 	First seen
PLC	13/02/2018 15:18:21
Criticality 	Last seen
HIGH	13/02/2018 15:23:35
Risk Level	
Normal	

Assets View – by layered map

Asset layered view according to Perdue model, with variety of view options like neighbors assets, communication direction, ARP baseline and hide assets with no communication



The screenshot displays the Check Point Assets View interface, featuring a layered map of assets. The interface is divided into several sections:

- ALERTS (5):** A list of alerts on the left side, including configuration downloads, uploads, failed login attempts, and configuration downloads to various controllers.
- LAYERED VIEW (125):** The main central area showing a layered map of 125 assets. The map is organized into horizontal layers, with nodes representing assets and lines indicating communication between them. The top layer contains the most assets, and the bottom layer contains the fewest.
- STATS:** A summary section on the right side, showing current asset statistics: 4 High Risk Level and 125 Active Assets. It also includes options for viewing new assets and alerts distribution from the last week.

The layered map interface includes various filters and controls at the top, such as 'View Type', 'Presets', and 'Reset'. Below the filters, there are dropdown menus for 'Type', 'Vendor', 'Protocol', and 'Criticality', along with a search bar. The map itself has a 'GRAPH VIEW' label on the left side and a 'RESET' button on the right side.



CHECK POINT'S

Security Solutions

for Industrial Control Systems/SCADA

CYBER DEFENSE

Visibility of
ICS/SCADA Traffic

**Enforcement of
ICS/SCADA Traffic**

SCADA-Aware
Threat Prevention

Ruggedized
Appliances for
Harsh
Environments

SCADA

Enforcement



Pre-defined Policies

- **Learning phase** - network traffic and logging
- Manual setting of SCADA commands baseline
- Specific Command policies
- Specific Values policies
- Time of Day and traffic patterns policies

Anomaly Detection

- **Learning phase** - Automatically Discover Assets and communication
- Anomaly-Based Behavior Analysis
- Generate High-Fidelity Baseline Model
- Generate security and process threats

Combined Enforcement of Pre-Defined + Anomaly-Based analysis

Setting the Baseline

Granular level logging of SCADA traffic –



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Detailed forensics for
incident investigations

ANALYZED
by
Check Point
SMARTLOG &
SMARTEVENT













DETAILED

Time	B...	A...	T...	Origin	Application...	Transa...	Fu...	Function Description	Source	Desti...	...	Match
Today	10:45:35			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33394	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Pr
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33490	4	Read Input Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Pro
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33490	4	Read Input Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33489	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33489	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33488	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33488	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33487	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33487	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33486	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33486	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33485	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:53			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33485	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33484	4	Read Input Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33484	4	Read Input Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33483	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33483	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33482	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33482	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33481	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33481	3	Read Holding Registers	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot
Today	10:45:51			gw-71ec22	ModbusAll	33480	3	Read Holding Registers - Response	HMI-1	PLC-1		SCADA Prot

GROUPED

Count	Source	Destination	Unit ID	Function Description
500	HMI (10.1.1.5)	PLC (20.1.1.5)	1	Read Holding Registers
100	HMI (10.1.1.5)	PLC (20.1.1.5)	1	Read Input Registers
1	HMI (10.1.1.5)	PLC (20.1.1.5)	1	Write Single Register


Manual setting of SCADA commands baseline

No.	Hits	Name	Source	Destination	Applications/Sites	Action	Track
1	 0	baseline policy	 HMI  SCADA_Srv	 PLC  PLC_1  PLC_4	 Modbus Protocol - read input register  Modbus Protocol - read-write multiple registers  Modbus Protocol - write multiple registers  Modbus Protocol - write single register	 Allow	 Extended Log

- **Learning phase** – logging of network traffic
- Setting SCADA commands baseline
- Specific Command policies
- Passive (Alert) or optional Active (Block) policy

Alerts by Behavior Analysis

Alerts window with filtering capabilities and Alerts tree according to Process integrity and Security events



The screenshot displays the Check Point Alerts interface. On the left is the 'ACTIVITY LOG' with a list of system events. The main area shows 'ALERTS (5)' with filters for 'PROCESS INTEGRITY ALERTS' and 'SECURITY EVENTS ALERTS'. Below the filters is a table of results with columns for ID, TYPE, DESCRIPTION, DATE DETECTED, SITE, CATEGORY, NETWORK, STATUS, and ASSIGNED TO.

ID	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	DATE DETECTED	SITE	CATEGORY	NETWORK	STATUS	ASSIGNED TO
736	Configuration Download	A configuration has been downloaded to controller 10.1.34.1 by SCHEIDER_ENG	13/02/2018 15:25:54	Default	Integrity	Default	Unresolved	
732	Configuration Upload	A configuration has been uploaded from controller 10.1.34.1 by SCHEIDER_ENG	13/02/2018 15:25:12	Default	Integrity	Default	Unresolved	
729	Login	There has been a failed login attempt to controller 10.1.0.80 from WIN-67VSTM77Q31	13/02/2018 15:24:40	Default	Security	Default	Unresolved	
687	Configuration Download	A configuration has been downloaded to controller RO by WINDOWS7	13/02/2018 15:22:32	Default	Integrity	Default	Unresolved	
497	Configuration Download	A configuration has been downloaded to controller Chemical_plant by ENG_AB, by user ENG_AB\Administrator	13/02/2018 15:19:46	Default	Integrity	Default	Unresolved	



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SCADA

Legacy Systems Are Often Unpatched



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all the site

Solutions | Products

Support

You are here: Home > Support > Cybersecurity > Vulnerabilities

ProductCERT Security Advisories

Siemens ProductCERT is the central team for responding to security incidents and vulnerabilities related to Siemens solutions and services. In the following, Siemens security bulletins issued by ProductCERT are listed.

2016

- > SSA-751155 (Last Update 2016-04-08): Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in SIMATIC Manager
- > SSA-623229 (Last Update 2016-04-08): DROWN Vulnerability in Industrial Ethernet
- > SSA-301706 (Last Update 2016-04-08): GNU C Library Vulnerability in SIMATIC Manager
- > SSA-151221 (Last Update 2016-03-18): Incorrect File Permissions in SIMATIC Manager
- > SSA-833048 (Last Update 2016-03-14): Vulnerability in SIMATIC S7-1200
- > SSA-253230 (Last Update 2016-02-08): Vulnerabilities in SIMATIC S7-1200
- > SSA-743465 (Last Update 2016-01-15): Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability in SIMATIC Manager

2015

- > SSA-472334 (Last Update 2015-12-18): NTP Vulnerabilities in RUGGEDC Devices
- > SSA-763427 (Last Update 2016-04-29): Vulnerability in Communication modules SIMATIC CP 343-1, TIM 3V-IE, TIM 4R-IE, and CP 443-1
- > SSA-921524 (Last Update 2016-04-29): Incorrect Frame Padding in RUGGEDC Devices
- > SSA-720081 (Last Update 2015-09-01): IP Forwarding in RUGGEDC Devices
- > SSA-134003 (Last Update 2015-08-27): Web Vulnerability in S7-1200

World presence | Customer Care Centre | Cybersecurity | News | Report an incident | Substitution tool | Counterfeiting | Definitions | Report a counterfeit | Idea Submission

HOME • ABOUT • TECHNOLOGY • CYBER SECURITY • ALERTS AND NOTIFICATIONS

GLOBAL SITE • ENGLISH

Power and productivity for a better world™ **ABB**

Cyber security alerts and notifications

We are committed to providing our customers with products, systems and services that clearly address cyber security. Proper and timely handling of cyber security incidents and software vulnerabilities is one important factor in helping our customers minimize risks associated with cyber security.

Latest alerts and notifications | Archived alerts and notifications | Subscribe to email alerts | Report a vulnerability


2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in RTU500 Series
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in Relion 650 series Ver. 1.3.0
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in MicroSCADA Pro SYS600
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in SDM600 Ver. 1.1
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in AFx series
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in ETL000 series
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in ESP630 series
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in FOX660 series
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in Relion 615 series v5.0
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in COM600
 2015-12-10: POODLE Vulnerability in Protection and Control IED Manager PCM600

2015-02-11: Security Bulletin for ABB 3rd Party Device Type Library HART DTM
 2014-10-30: Advisory for ABB RobotStudio
 2014-10-30: Advisory for ABB Test Signal Viewer
 2014-04-24: (updated 2014-06-30): OpenSSL Heartbleed Vulnerability in Relion 650 series Ver. 1.3.0
 2014-02-19: CMT 1000 Vulnerability bug fix
 2013-11-06: Remote code execution vulnerability in CAP 501 / CAP 505 / SMS 510
 2013-11-08: Remote code execution vulnerabilities in MicroSCADA
 2013-10-17: Advisory for Test Signal Viewer on Windows for Robotics
 2012-04-30: Advisory for AC500 web server
 2012-03-23: Advisory for WebWare Components and Related Products
 2012-02-25: Buffer Overflow in Robot Communications Runtime on Windows

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Product	Vulnerability	Reference	Severity
25/01/2016	StruxureWare Building Operations	Weak Credentials and OS Command Injection	Automation Server series (AS, AS-P), V1.7 and prior	SEVD-2016-025-01
20/01/2016	Altivar Drives	Modification of Drive Parameters	See disclosure	ST03406
11/01/2016	MiCOM C264	Integer Overflow	See disclosure	SEVD-2016-011-01
10/12/2015	M340 PLC	Buffer Overflow	See disclosure	SEVD-2015-344-01
25/11/2015	ProClima SW	Remote Code Execution	ProClima, all versions prior to V6.2	SEVD-2015-329-01

Virtual patching

Over 300 dedicated IDS/IPS signatures



Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

Stops exploits of known vulnerabilities and detects anomalous traffic

PROTECTED
by
Check Point
IPS

Protection	Sever...
Citect SCADA ODBC Overflow Attempt	Medium
Rockwell RSLogix Denial of Service Vulnerability	Critical
SCADA Engine OPC Client Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	High
Schneider Electric UnitelWay Windows Device Driver Buffer Overflow	Critical
Siemens Tecnomatix FactoryLink Stack Overflow Vulnerability	Critical
Siemens Automation License Manager Multiple Vulnerabilities	Critical
ScadaTEC SCADAPhone and ModbusTagServer Buffer Overflow	High
RealWin HMI Service Buffer Overflow 2	High
Automated Solutions Modbus/TCP Master OPC server Modbus TCP Header	High
RealWin INFOTAG/SET_CONTROL Packet Processing Buffer Overflow	High
Unauthorized Miscellaneous Request to a PLC	Critical
Broadcast Request from an Authorized Client	Critical
IGSS SCADARMS Report Template WriteFile Command Buffer Overflow	Critical
IGSS SCADA STDREP Request Buffer Overflow	High
Iconics Genesis SCADA Freeing of Uninitialized Memory Trigger	High
Rockwell RNA Message Negative Header Length	Critical
Intellicom NetBiter Config HICP Hostname Buffer Overflow	Medium
WonderWare SuiteLink DOS Attempt	High



NSS Labs
Highest Rating



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SCADA

Check Point 1200R



Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

New Purpose-Built Ruggedized Security Gateway Appliance

- **Fully** featured Check Point security gateway
- **6x1GbE ports** and firewall throughput of 2Gbps
- **Compliant** to the most rigid regulations: IEC 61850-3 and IEEE 1613
- **Compact fan-less** design with no moving parts; temperature range from -40°C to 75°C
- Can be used in **In-line** or **Tap (Mirror)** modes
- **Routing and networking** (e.g: BGP, OSPF, IPsec, etc.)



CrashOverride/Industroyer – New ICS attack platform to Electric Grid Operations

- CrashOverride (called Industroyer as well) malware was the malware employed in the December 17th, 2016 cyber-attack on the Kiev, Ukraine transmission substation which resulted in electric grid operations impact. (As reported by [ESET](#) and [Dragos](#))
- ICS-CERT reported on June 14, 2017 <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A>
 - The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) described as part of the CrashOverride malware could be modified to target U.S. critical information networks and systems.
- CrashOverride malware is an extensible platform that could be used to target critical infrastructure sectors, specifically using IEC104 and IEC61850 protocols.
 - The malware issues valid commands directly to RTU's.
 - **Using Check Point protocols visibility and baselining would detect and alert on None-Baseline protocols and commands**
- Could exploit Siemens SIPROTEC relay denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability, leading to a shutdown of the relay.
 - Using CVE-2015-5374 to Hamper Protective Relays
 - **Check Point published on June 20th an IPS signature for virtual patching protection of the DoS vulnerability**



Check Point®
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

CASE STUDIES



OT Security Blueprint – Micro Segmentation



Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.



SCHAEFFLER


faurecia



abbvie



DAIMLER



OT Security Blueprint – High Availability

Management Facility

Main Control Center



SCADA Historian

SmartEvent



Control & monitor



Control
Monitor




1200R HA



PLC1

PLC2

PLC3



PLC4

Shop Floor

Shop Floor



Management Facility

Main Control Center



SCADA Historian

SmartEvent



Control & monitor



Control
Monitor



PLC1



PLC2



PLC3




PLC4


Shop Floor

Shop Floor


The Corporate Building (BMS)



Perimeter Segmentation




Functional Zone Segmentation




DPI of BMS Protocols
SCADA/IoT
MQTT, BACNET

- Energy Management
- HVAC
- Lighting
- Elevators
- Access & Security
- Water
- And more...

ICS & IoT Convergence (BMS Environment)



Remote Maintenance for Elevator or HVAC (and more)



Company's service center


- Secured connectivity (VPN)
- Protocol Visibility
- Command provisioning
- Access Control
- Remote Access VPN Client

Power Utilities — Substation Security



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- Typical power utility security deployment in substations
- Single or cluster solution for combined OT and IT traffic
- SCADA security



Securing a Transmission System Operator (TSO) Control Systems




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Reasons to Choose Check Point

- Simple to manage
- Virtual Machine deployment
- Ability to granularly inspect SCADA protocols




- Each Data center is designed to control the entire national grid in case of failure of all the others
- Fully redundant topology by 3 Firewalls per Data Center



Wind Farms Topology



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
Waste Water Treatment Network

Applicable in Oil and Gas (Off/On-Shore)



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
- **Security Motivation** – New regulation for Critical Infrastructure
- **Challenge and CHKP Advantage** – Managing thousands of remote sites






UNIFIED IT and OT MANAGEMENT

FOR BEST ROI AND OPTIMAL PROTECTION



**Customized
Visibility**



**Unified
Policy**



**Everywhere
Monitoring**



**Management integration
With Leading SIEM systems:
Q-Radar, ARCSight, Splunk
And more like Predix and
others**



Dedicated Compliance and Regulation Monitoring



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NERC CIP (v.5) Regulation Requirement CIP-007-5: Req. 3.1

Regulatory Requirements Details

- Description:**
Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code. [Taken from Requirement 7: Cyber Security - System Security Management]

Relevant Security Best Practices: 32 out of 39 items are secure

ID	Name	Blade	Status
AB106	Check the frequency of scheduled Malware Updates in the Anti-Bot blade	Anti-Bot	Secure
AB105	Check that the Malware Database is automatically updated	Anti-Bot	Secure
AV115	Check the frequency of the Anti-Virus database updates	Anti-Virus	Secure
AV114	Check that the Anti-Virus database is automatically updated	Anti-Virus	Secure
AV113	Check the frequency of scheduled Malware Updates in the Anti-Bot blade	Anti-Virus	Secure

SCADA SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE CHECKS

REPORTED
by
Check Point
COMPLIANCE BLADE

**Real-time assessment of
compliance with major regulations**

Industrial Security Process



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Visibility - Independently **log** all SCADA activity:

Network, Protocols, Commands, Values

Define **Baseline** and **Policies**

Set Rules based on Known / Unknown / Not Allowed **or** Anomaly Based Behavior Analysis

Detection - Identify **Deviations and Attacks / Anomaly Detection**

Based on the defined rules, time of day, attack patterns

Enforcement – **Passive (Alert) / Active (Prevent)**

Based on configuration and/or topology – In-line or Tap

Check Point Offering- End to End Security suite for Critical Infrastructure IT and OT networks



Most extensive security support of ICS/SCADA protocols



Full OT to IT security segmentation



Large Scale Management – Market “Gold Standard” (Gartner)



Check Point offers complete security suite from Mobile, End-Point to the Cloud – including Private cloud for separation of IT from OT



Check Point®
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

THANK YOU

ONE STEP AHEAD